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Does mathematical knowledge build on itself continually over time, or does its 
historical fabric reveal abrupt and irregular breaks in an otherwise smooth and 
flowing pattern? Does it make sense to speak of revolutions in the history of 
mathematics, and, if so, what kinds of revolutions seem to occur? The present 
volume, a collection of essays written by a dozen historians and philosophers of 
mathematics, addresses this controversial issue from a variety of different per- 
spectives. In a certain sense, it may also be seen as a welcome effort on the part of 
the editor, Donald Gillies, to reengage a debate and the historians who initiated it 
in the mid 1970s. 
Gillies's introduction discusses the pertinent prehistory and the general plan of 
the book. This is followed by reprints of earlier essays written by Michael Crowe, 
Herbert Mehrtens, and Joseph Dauben. In the wake of Thomas Kuhn's influential 
study, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions [Kuhn 1962, 1970]--a work which 
itself sparked a revolution in the historiography of the natural sciences--these 
three historians staked out their own positions regarding the viability of Kuhn's 
model within the field of mathematics. Crowe rejected the idea of revolutionary 
change outright; Mehrtens found Kuhn's approach suggestive insofar as it empha- 
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sized the social dimension of the creation of knowledge, but argued against its 
wider efficacy; Dauben largely distanced himself rom the Kuhnian model, sug- 
gesting a different kind of analogy between periods of upheaval in mathematics 
and revolutionary events that transpire in the political arena. 
The consensus of opinion, as presented here and in the new essays that follow 
(including more recent reflections by Crowe, Mehrtens, and Dauben), suggests 
that revolutions do, indeed, occur in the history of mathematics, but that these 
often cannot be understood in terms of the "paradigm shifts," "disciplinary ma- 
trices," or "exemplars" so central to Kuhn's theory. Thus, while Caroline Dun- 
more prefers to view abrupt changes in mathematics as taking place at a "meta- 
level," neither she nor any of the other contributors appears willing to subscribe 
to Crowe's "tenth law," according to which "revolutions never occur in mathe- 
matics." Nevertheless, Dunmore's views are far more consonant with Crowe's 
than are those of most of the other contributors. 
This is particularly clear in the case of Luciano Boi. In examining the profound 
shift in conceptions of space that unfolded over the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, Boi explicitly rejects Crowe's previously conventional view, but he also 
argues against any attempt (like Kuhn's) to explain dramatic shifts in mathemati- 
cal outlook by appealing to sociological factors operating within the research 
community. Boi's criticism of Crowe's position is directed toward a central point 
of contention in this debate. By denying revolutionary change in mathematics, 
Crowe seeks to differentiate between a stable body of mathematical knowledge 
proper and incidental factors such as the form in which mathematical ideas are 
represented. Thus, he contends that the content of mathematics remains essen- 
tially unaffected even amid revolutionary changes in "mathematical nomencla- 
ture, symbolism, metamathematics" (p. 19), and other related forms of expres- 
sion. These factors may impinge upon mathematical developments, but Crowe 
regards them as lying "outside" (p. 19) mathematics proper. 
Herbert Mehrtens addressed this issue in his 1976 paper (reprinted here) on 
"Kuhn's Theories and Mathematics," and in doing so he already pointed to the 
Achilles heel of Crowe's argument. For as tempting as it may seem to distinguish 
form from content in mathematics, there seem to be no practical criteria for 
making such a distinction and utilizing it to illuminate concrete historical situa- 
tions. Any attempt o circumscribe the "substance" of mathematics and to set 
this off against some other (presumably ess essential) concomitants ofmathemati- 
cal knowledge (for example, the language or symbolism used by particular authors 
in a given era) quickly leads to a quagmire of historical difficulties. (This point was 
forcefully made in connection with ancient mathematics by Sabetai Unguru in 
[Unguru 1975].) 
While the present volume testifies to a new-found convergence of interests 
uniting historians and philosophers of mathematics, it also betrays a problem that 
continues to plague both disciplines, namely, the tendency to dramatize founda- 
tional issues and debates while overlooking the vast terrain that actually domi- 
nated the attention of leading researchers. Donald Gillies's introductory remark 
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that the volume "deals with most of the major episodes in mathematical history 
from Descartes in the 1630s to Robinson in the 1960s" hinges, I suppose, on what 
is meant by a "major episode" (p. 8). Still, such a statement certainly suggests an 
extremely contracted view of the mathematical landscape over this lengthy and 
exceedingly rich period. This point can perhaps best be illustrated through some 
passing remarks on the individual contributions. 
Several articles in the book represent case studies that seek to shed light on its 
general theme. Paolo Mancosu, for example, considers arguments for and against 
considering Descartes's G~om~trie a revolutionary contribution to the history of 
mathematics, ultimately finding the negative side of the equation weightier. Emily 
Grosholz, on the other hand, marshals considerable evidence supporting the view 
that Leibniz was a truly revolutionary figure. Both studies are solid enough, but 
their narrow focus leads to an inevitable artificiality. Just as one cannot hope to 
frame an argument about the general nature of revolutions in mathematics on the 
basis of a few case studies (even with such pivotal figures as Descartes and 
Leibniz), so is it illusory to expect that one can gain any real insight into the 
revolutionary (or nonrevolutionary) character of a mathematician' s work without 
first addressing the global issues involved. Thus, neither of these contributions 
offers any significant new findings with regard to the overall structure of mathe- 
matical revolutions. 
An interesting attempt to analyze the "fine structure" of a particular evolution 
comes from Giulio Giorello. By examining the repercussions in Britain of the 
debates over the foundations of the calculus, Giorello invokes the idea of compet- 
ing "paradigms of legimitation" (pp. 139-140). Whereas Kuhn emphasized the 
sense of loss and disorientation that normally accompanies such crises, Giorello 
stresses the creative role of a transitional figure like Colin Maclaurin, whose work 
mediated between an older geometrical paradigm and one grounded on modern 
analytical concepts. The latter "revolution in rigor" inaugurated by Cauchy re- 
ceives brief attention in Dauben's "Revolutions Revisited," where it is treated as 
a prelude to a discussion of the impact of Abraham Robinson's nonstandard 
analysis. 
Non-Euclidean geometry--a theme that has proven to be a perennial favorite 
for historians and philosophers of mathematics alike--is accorded its traditional 
place of honor in an article by Yuxin Zheng. Quoting Morris Kline with approval 
("The creation of non-Euclidean geometry was the most consequential nd revo- 
lutionary step in mathematics since Greek times") (p. 169), Zheng covers this 
well-trodden trail without turning up any new surprises. 
The contributions of Herbert Breger and Donald Gillies also deal with particular 
aspects of the foundations of mathematics. Breger considers the little-known 
work of Paul Finsler on set theory and gives a thoughtful analysis of why Finsler's 
theory failed to find significant support. His argument, as noted by Gillies, echoes 
Giorello's claims about he role of "paradigms of legitimacy." Gillies own discus- 
sion of "The Fregean Revolution in Logic" follows an eclectic approach that has 
much in common with Kuhn's but also with Dauben's orientation. 
Finally, the article by Caroline Dunmore, "Meta-level Revolutions in Mathe- 
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matics," delves into nineteenth-century algebra  bit, but most of the discussion 
hovers well above the historical ground. Moreover, once again one encounters the 
philosophers' penchant for extrapolating from an analysis of a highly restricted set 
of mathematical results to a sweeping characterization f the mathematical enter- 
prise as a whole. Here, as elsewhere throughout the volume, one wonders about 
the "disciplinary matrix" that produced the mathematics under discussion. 
The most striking exception in this regard is Jeremy Gray's paper on "The 
Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Mathematical Ontology," which points the 
way to some promising new terrain. Drawing on developments in algebraic num- 
ber theory and geometry, Gray suggests that the fundamental concepts employed 
by research mathematicians in these fields underwent a subtle, but radical shift 
over the course of the century. Rather than looking inward to account for these 
changes, however, he suggests that we view them as part of a large-scale transfor- 
mation that transcended not only the particular disciplines involved but even the 
field of mathematics itself. 
One of the strengths of Kuhn's theory resides in its unity. It offers an account of 
how revolutionary changes can explode within a discipline, yet, just as important, 
it provides a framework for understanding the standard phenomenon, "normal 
science," that is, the norms that guide scientific research during periods of stable 
development. To address the role of "revolutions" (Kuhnian or otherwise) in the 
history of mathematics, it would seem essential to have a fairly clear idea of what 
constituted "normal" research-level mathematics in a given era. Unfortunately, 
this side of the matter has received but scant attention in the historical literature. 
One can only hope that the present undertaking will at least inspire others to 
reconsider the overall development of mathematical knowledge both during its 
phases of relative normalcy and during those periods when new or rival ideas 
disrupted the scene. Part of the challenge this poses for historians of mathematics 
would be to identify the dominant fields of research and their practitioners, partic- 
ularly during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the discipline 
operated in a variety of new social, institutional, and professional contexts. With- 
out a clearer picture of mainstream developments in modern mathematical re- 
search and the factors that sustained them, general discussions about the growth 
and development of mathematical knowledge are unlikely to lead to major new 
breakthroughs. 
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